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In any rational authority system, authority must be closely connected to point, purpose and function. The situation of authority in colleges and univer-.sities (T.E.l.s*) provides a special case of such point, purpose and function.
The present paper tries to show the quite special features of the epistemic dKI'O~l\fleaCle) authority of academics that provide rational justification for their in many positions of social authority in their institutions. To do this, (1) aspects of the point, purpose and function of such epistemic ,tn'"lrIf·'I>." will be demonstrated, (2) the logical necessity of academic nes for rational endeavour will be pointed out, and (3) the mistakes inin the common notion of educational democracy will be exposed.
Point, Purpose and Function of Epistemic Authority
Firstly, some general societal aspects of epistemic authority should be inIt is clear that no person can hope to master more than a minute part of the 10\'~leclae that exists. In order that it is all mastered, there need to be 1ovvle(jge!'s~)eciali~sts: this is similar to saying that there need to be epistemic Concomitantly, it can be argued that the vast body of knowledge mastered by people who become epistemic authorities, if the complex, industrial, liberal Western democracies are to continue to what makes the existence of knowledge or epistemic a sort of natural necessity, is that mastery of any area of :lWleaCle is itself a slow and laborious business, that must be gone through person is in a position to understand, let alone, to criticise, judge, develop the area, in an informed rather than a superficial way. (It is case that some people just seem to be 'drawn' to particular and to do well at them, while there are areas of knowledge that intelligent part of the population is just incapable of understanding.) , as de George says, Reliance on authority is a way in which knowledge can be transmitted and shared, so that more men may know and use this knowledge than would otherwise be the case. This, in brief, is the basis for the argument that epistemic authority is in general legitimate. The argument is a '" tertiary educational institution pragmatic one, and it claims that in some cases it is reasonable and rational to accept the word of someone else that p is the case (de George, 1976, p.83) .
And further, Epistemic authority is thus in principle substitutional in nature. Its purpose is to substitute the knowledge of one person in a certain field for the lack of knowledge of another (de George, 1976, p.82) .
So whereras social authority uses other persons to get things done, knowledge authority is used by other persons both to gain knowledge and to get things done.
Two qualifications should now be made. Certainly it would seem that the sensible thing to do for anyone who is not an authority on a given subject, is .. to defer to the beliefs of those who are, for what better grounds can one who is not knowledgeable in a given field have for a belief in that area than that it is the belief of one who is knowledgeable in such matters, especially of one whose business is to know about such things?* (Adams, 1976, pA) What is more, the person knows, ". ,. that the authority, in assessing the reasons that are available to him, has been led to this position" (Adams, 1976, p.5) . But while all this is true, it (a) must be carefully noted that the knowledge or epistemic authority is indeed restricted to the area of knowledge, except for some possible transfer to adjacent disciplines and except for"_ •. the transfer of scholarly habits of care, toughmindedness, etc/' (de George, 1976, p.85) .
And (b) someone is to be considered an authority in various degrees: the history teacher is an authority in relation to his pupils: depending on his special period, he mayor may not be an authority in relation to the T.E.lleeturer. Secondly, some specific attributes of the individual epistemological authority should be noted.
Academics have themselves passed through T.E.l.s specifically established to train and educate. They have acquired specialist knowledge and u ding, and in various degrees some expertise in passing on and developing this knowledge and understanding in others. And the diplomas and degrees they have acquired are society's stamps of approval to show that this is indeed case. This is far from suggesting that T.E.I academics are all-knowing, or some very narrow and bigoted people do not become academics. Neither is to suggest that for those academics who have teaching qualifications qualifications are fool-proof and mistakes never made in such certification. is merely to say that most academics have mastered a significant ding in a specialist area.
As time passes, academics generally increase this knowledge and PVI'lP,-ti"i' developing, modifying and refining it through interaction with others through a developing sensitivity to the nuances of the discipline. *The author is not talking about matters of mere belief, (such as religion?)
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Academics also .demonstrate their knowledge and competence: they ~evelop understanding and a degree of mastery in their students; they contmue to turn out graduates who can take their place in the complex activities . th~ fact that academics are knowledge authorities who make ~uthorltatlve ~taten:ents. It·is merely that they have passed through a period and place of ~nductlo~, and such induction is in principle equally possible for other. ratlon~1 being. Indeed, students in T.E.l.s are at various stages in very induction .. For the academic in his justified role is trying to make ~edundant, In.the sense of trying to get his students no longer to need , trymg to make hiS students into his epistemic peers. The academic life innot just .the disinterested pursuit of knowledge, but also the .disiint,erested passing-on of knowledge.
There is of course a crucial corollary. An academic is to be listened to !pt:l'lidll:;t:l he is an authority. But his authoritative utterance, like all such luv,rn,:lJIUI:! authority is only provisional. For we know very well that the in-I history of mankind is a succession of the establishment then later of statements by an authority. The chemist, Arrhenius was awardthe Nobel Prize for his electrolYtic theory of dissociation; it was later given Debye for showing the inadequacies in Arrhenius's theory (Barbour, 1971, In cosmol?gy, Ptolemaic worldviews were succeeded by Copernician, Newtonlan and then Einsteinian, with questions nowadays even beasked about the last.
showed the physicians of nineteenth century Vienna that it was who spread puerperal fever in childbed. Ben Jonson has given place to Dr. Johnson, Bradley, Knights or Knight, and Lewis in authoritative of Shakespeare. We know that today's authoritative utterance tomorrow. But equally, we know very well that we ought proto accept such statements as the best at present available. The fact one au:~ority replaces another as time goes by is no argument for the relatiVity of knowledge or truth. Rather, it is evidence for the opposite:
the later authoritative statement is really a better explanation, a nearer approximation to the truth.
Students should have to do what academics tell them to do in connexion with the progagation of knowledge and understanding, because at least relatively speaking academics in T. E.I.s are provisional epistemic authorities. It is perfectly proper for academics to make pronouncements, give opinions, develop insights, demand answers, provide examples, promulgate orders and expect particular sorts of behaviour from their students in academic situations. But at the same time it is essential as I have said elsewhere (1976, p.6 ) that they do these things in a 'teacherly' way: authoritatively, not 'authoritarianly' . Academics must develop epistemic authority, but equally they must develop a general and appropriate scepticism. This requires a nice balance between authoritative statement and qualification, and is probably the chief difference between being authoritative and being authoritarian. In being authoritative and' teacherly' , academics will try to develop in students a proper propensity to question, by showing that the evolution of human knowledge has been a gradual refinement, differentiation and development, but also the realisation that in epistemic matters one person's opinion is not just as good as another's.
The upshot of the last few pages is that, as Peters argues, .
•. knowledge can only be handed on and developed if institutions are devised for this purpose. If such institutions are to be organised on rational grounds, this means that those who are authorities on various matters are given the opportunity to instruct others and to take part in the administation of the affairs of their institutions. Those who are authorities must be put in positions of authority at a level which is consistent with the principle of public accountability (1966, p.251) .
Peters is arguing that in a rational system, knowledge authorities because. they are knowledge authorities should be given the right to social authority. So for Peters, and the present writer agrees, the situation of the Kno"""leCIQe authority in the educational institution is but a special case of the more situation in a society that is based on rational authority. Here the crucial the rational authority situation comes through the interesting idea because what the epistemic authority says is right (correct, advisable), given the right (entitlement) to give orders, tell people what to do, in to that knowledge authority he possesses. This seems to me to have the portant corollary that academics should work hard at showing that epistemic authority is· actully a resource for the community in general and students in particular.
The Logically-Necessary Connexion Between Rationality and Al:aQ'errl!C Disciplines
It has so far been argued that it is rational to give social authority in T. to academics because in so doing, the point, purpose and function of T. are met. But other aspects of rationality can also be shown to feature 52 in the ~itu.ation. These have to do with the necessary rationality of epistemic authority Itself, embodied in epistemic authorities. . The mor~ complex the language that takes in these aspects, the more ratlon~1 does .'t become possible for the thought and behaviour to be. And it is .preclsely this. more complex language that makes up the entities that we refer to as theoretical knowledge or knowledge of disciplines.
For bei~g rational involves not merely having concern for the point purpose function of an orga~isation or institution. It also involves, in' meeting p.urpose an.d functlo~ such features as seeking the truth, trying to get right, ar~~lng as loglcal~y as possible, providing good reasons for any ,,,,,,::;\,Lua, pO~I.tlon held (which of course includes bringing to bear apempIrical data) discriminating only when there are relevant difand so ~n. The reason for mentioning this aspect of rationality here, show how It strengthen~ the. case of the epistemic authority; for the of .~nowledge of th~ eplstemlc authority would seem to put him in an position to complYI/I(~th these strictures of rationality in his own area of . Clearly, rati?n~lity has a great deal to do with the quality of . The better the thl.nkl~g, the more rational the argument, the more rathe person, and derivatively the more rational the organisation.
But there is a f~rther ~n?erlying, epistemologically-fundamental aspect of that reqUlr~s pOinting out. Without this aspect, the very existence of worse, r~tlon~1 ~r more or less rational thinking would itself be imBennett IS pOinting to this fundamental feature when he writes, . passlng-o . n no b 11' d "the state's political and social concerns . may succl,nctly e ca e dl I' t f things such as general concern for concerns Involve an en ess IS 0 ~This section owes much to the writing of R.S. Peters. 54 munity health and welfare, pensions for the old, road safety campaigns, foreign policy, crime prevention, providing money for defence, protecting the political interests of minorities, ensuring there are sufficient T. E.l.s, and so on. With respect to many of these issues, the ideas of one person are as good as those of another, hence the electoral policies of one man one vote that ~"~".~~ on representatives to do the final deciding.
But the purpose of a T.E.1. is not multiple in this way. T.E.l.s pursue knowledge and provide education and training for students in particular specialist areas. And as has just been argued, it is manifest that there are .th,nri1·i"" in these areas. So in order for academics to carry out these purproperly performing their functions, what is required is not some nl"hi~iti~ democracy, but the implementation of the two principles that Peters autonomy of academics (academic freedom), and provisional of academics (1973, pp. 44-45) . knowledge is to be expanded and truth to be pursued, and if students are to inducted into this knowledge, then academics must be allowed freedom to on such endeavours. They must not be restricted by the predilections of politicians, businessmen, trade union leaders, authoritarian istrators, short-sighted student activists, or anyone else who may or find inconvenient to their cause, the things that pursuit of truth and ge reveal. To give in. to any of these is to provide the thin edge of the for the others. PolitYcal interference is probably the most all-encomand invidious. Examples are legion in most of the world outside the . Two representative examples are the disastrous effect on academic life University of Ghana by President Nkrumah, and the complete destrucof such academic life by Amin in Uganda. But examples are common of influence by some of the other groups just mentioned, for example 'MIt1,,~,nr<'<>r1 student interference during the 1960s in academic life not only but in other parts of the world. To take but one instance. At the of Chile in Santiago, the Research Assistant in the Medical School his laboratory left uncleaned for six months because he opposed various to power by students and ancillary staff. This had the most adverse efon the breeding programme in genetics, where twenty years of work (personal communication to the present writer).
ng from the principle of the provisional authority of academics for earlier) is the claim that it is usually only academics who know just what is needed in a course that is to help students to master and just what areas at the edges of the field are likely to for further research and exploration. This means that academics have the controlling say in the content of courses, in the appointments academics in the field, and in the general control of accreditation of in that field (j .e. examining). Bell makes a significant observation, in calls the paradox of authoritarian (he means' authoritative' ) justificahe says, difficulty is that the very inequality for which the exercise of authority remedy may preclude those at whose benefit it is aimed from judging it is being exercised competently or not. I cannot help but feel that this difficulty has been nicely illustrated in recent months (Bell was talking of 1970) by some campus debated between academics and under-graduates about the content of courses and curricula. Academics, called upon to justify their dealings with the undergraduate mind, face the difficuhy that it is an undergraduate mind which has to comprehend this justification. Hence the very justification itself risks appearing in undergraduate quarters as yet a further exercise of unjustified and arbitrary authority (1971, p.202) .
Of course this does not mean that there are not times when academics need to be brought back to earth from their ivory towers by way of financial constraints and community pressures, or that there are not times when coteries of academics who decide to appoint only persons who hold political views similar to their own should be constrained by the outside democracy from using the T.E.1. as a place for indoctrination. It merely emphasises the significance of the principle of the provisional authority of academics and thus their crucial position in the authority hierarchy of T.E.l.s.
Secondly, the above model of T. E.I. democracy is suspect in so far as, even in the wider democracy outside the walls of the T. E.I., one man one vote is ed only in specific cases. It is used to elect representatives to do the deciding in a parliament and a cabinet; it is thus used where issues are mUltiple general ones where the average person's opinion is as good as any other. although there are referenda on various issues, these are infrequent, and of general non-specialist concern to all citizens. Again, while there are course one man one vote situations in all sorts of organisations inside general democracy such situations occur only when one person's opinion as good as another, e.g. to decide on cricket club policy, or to elect the man of the women's institute. What is more, the general democracy also deed appoints specialists in a wide range of areas, and leaves them alone get on with their work. In fact, for the multiple purposes of a democracy to carried on, such specialists must most of the time be left to get on with job. And getting on with the job entails authoritative activity and decision, elections. To take an extreme case that makes the point properly: prisons fulfil their point, purpose and function in the general democracy by being autocratically. Hospitals are largely in the control of medical personnel, patients. And the same sorts of consideration apply from fire brigades kindergartens. In short, appropriate institutions in the larger democracy, order to fulfil their function and to run rationally do not have to be 'democratically' if by 'democratically' is meant one man one vote and plebicites of the consumers or clients. Brubacher argues similarly . ,. neither college nor university is a political community. Its b not government but the discovery, publication and teaching of learning. Its governance is based not on numbers or the rule of jority, but on knowledge. The fact that a society is politically nrr,,,nll,,,,,n a democracy does not entail that all its other institutions--its industrial corporations, military and naval forces--must be so (1977, p.36 
